INTRODUCTION
Time plots of catches by fisheries for small pelagic species often show a characteristic pattern. The fishery builds up to a sharp peak of high catches, then drops steeply as the resource becomes scarce. This pattern might occur only once in a fishery's history, or several times with a separation of decades. It is not uncommon for a different small pelagic species to become more abundant, providing a new fisheries target, after the formerly mostprized species vacates its niche. Similar spike-and-collapse patterns can take place in the substitute fisheries as well.
Population volatility appears widespread among small pelagic species. As relatively short-lived forage fish, they experience intermittent strong year classes. Spawning and migration cycles are sensitive to annual-scale variations in ocean environment or climate. Fishing pressure can accentuate this volatility. The characteristic spikes of pelagic fishery catches represent not simply peaks in abundance, as it has been tempting to assume. Rather, they are peaks in fisheries success, an imperfect correlate of abundance. Unsustainable peaks can result from intensified fishing effort, market demand or technological innovations, even while abundance itself declines. Intensification temporarily masks decline, but catches eventually come down too -often with a crash. Some dramatic failures of twentiethcentury pelagic fisheries occurred when rising fisheries pressure coincided with falling environmental conditions, a double blow against a resource.
Order-of-magnitude fluctuations in small-pelagic stocks have consequences on land, where families, enterprises and communities depend on the resource. The human dimensions of pelagic-fishery troubles have been particularly prominent in the case of Norwegian spring-spawning herring, a once-vast stock that during the first half of the 20th century supported fishing communities around the northeast Atlantic, then almost vanished in a late-1960s collapse. With the collapse, herring towns lost their main resource, and faced an urgent need to find other livelihoods. The societal aftermath, as well as the build-up, shows some common elements across different places. Here, we illustrate with the stories of some individual communities -Siglufjörður, a North Iceland village that boomed briefly as the 'Herring Capital of the World'; Seyðisfjörður and Neskaupstaður in the Eastfjords of Iceland, which succeeded Siglufjörður as the centre of Iceland's herring boom during its final stage in the 1960s; and Råkvåg, a quieter Norwegian village where centuries of herring fishing ended with the collapse.
The fisherfolk of these and many other herring towns pursued essentially the same large migratory stock. Adverse environmental shifts around Iceland, together with overfishing (putting pressure on different herring life stages and during different seasons) on both Norwegian and Icelandic grounds, reduced this common stock by more than 95 per cent. Three decades later, the stock had regained only a fraction of its former size and range (for an overview, see Vilhjálmsson, 1997) . The shared fates of Icelandic and Norwegian herring fisheries reflect their shared resource.
Signs of synchrony among more distant pelagic fisheries, for example Atlantic and Pacific herring, have also been observed, but their causes are less obvious. One class of explanations looks for teleconnections through global or hemispheric climate, which might impact Atlantic and Pacific ecosystems alike. We suggest an alternative or supplementary hypothesis. The correlations between Atlantic and Pacific fisheries might at least partly be due to humans, and in this respect not so different from what happened to the Atlantic herring towns.
NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING
The Atlanto-Scandian herring (Clupea harengus) complex consists of several main stocks, the largest of which is Norwegian spring-spawning herring. Through the early and middle 20th century, the stock followed an annual migration around the northeast Atlantic. Typically, most of the stock spawned in spring along the coast of Norway and around the Faeroe Islands (Figure 4.1a) . Larvae drifted north into the Barents Sea, and mature fish (and eventually, the younger recruits) made a westward migration to feeding grounds north and east of Iceland. The stock wintered in a small area east of Iceland, migrating eastwards again towards Norway for spring spawning (Vilhjálmsson, 1997) . During the 1950s and 1960s, this pattern altered drastically, as the world's greatest herring resource almost vanished . It remained at low levels through the late 1980s, then noticeably started to recover -primarily in Norwegian waters.
Norwegian spring-spawning herring had been known and fished for centuries on their spawning areas along the Norwegian coast. In the mid-19th century, fishers from Norway discovered that the same herring were abundant on feeding grounds north and east of Iceland in summer and autumn (Figure 4.1a) . Norwegians initiated a fishery that provided herring-salting jobs, and built wooded houses (an improvement over the Icelanders' mainly turf dwellings) in east Iceland towns such as Seyðisfjörður. Learning from the foreigners, Icelanders began their own fishing company in Siglufjörður on the north coast in 1880. Initially, fishing efforts were concentrated within the fjords. The first peak of Iceland's herring fishery faded in the late 1800s, as the climate worsened and prices fell on European markets (Sigurðsson, 1989) .
Herring fishing recovered with warming conditions during the early part of the 20th century. For Iceland, this helped set in motion a remarkable climb from poverty to affluence. Larger vessels using the new purse-seine technology explored offshore feeding grounds and brought back unprecedented catches. The international fishery in Icelandic waters took between 10 000 and 25 000 tonnes per year during the first decades of the 20th century. Initially, Icelandic vessels accounted for only a small fraction of the catch in Icelandic waters, but after 1915 they became dominant. Total catches continued their uneven increase, reaching peaks above 200 000 tonnes several times in the 1930s and 1940s. These good herring seasons contributed to Iceland's achievement of economic, then political independence in the 1940s (Kristfinnsson, 2001) .
During these years, strong markets, improving technology and increasing effort led to rising success in exploiting the stock throughout the northeastern Atlantic. Total catches fluctuated around a general upward trend, exceeding one million tonnes per year during the 1950s (top graph, Figure 4 .2). Expanding markets together with technological innovationssonar to locate herring schools, and power-block-assisted purse-seines of nylon mesh to catch them -propelled a mid-1960s spike that reached almost two million tonnes.
Collapse followed quickly after this 'killer spike', as catches fell below 100 000 tonnes in 1969 and 10 000 tonnes in 1973. In retrospect, it was clear that the golden years had been times of unsustainable overfishing. Estimated spawning biomass of the spring-spawning stock declined from 14 million tonnes in 1950 to less than half a million tonnes in 1972. As the lower plot of Figure 4 .2 shows, the 1960s spike in catches occurred at a time when biomass had already dropped by 74 per cent in just 16 years. Rising catches combined with falling population size to produce an abrupt jump (bottom), 1950-2004 in fishing mortality, effectively killing off the resource. Only a coastal remnant of the stock survived around Norway (Figures 4.1b-c) . The temporary disconnect between biomass and catches is a key observation from Figure 4 .2, and we return to this point later, as it applies to a different ocean.
Overfishing drove the steady decline of herring biomass after 1950. Climate change, however, played a role in the crucial decade of the 1960s. From 1920 until 1965, during the herring fishery's best years, relatively warm conditions prevailed over the northern North Atlantic. Cold, lowsalinity Arctic surface water, which formed a boundary for the herring feeding area, generally stayed north of Iceland, as indicated by the 2°C isotherm in Figure 4 .1a. In 1965 there was a sudden change, and this front shifted southeast (Figure 4 .1b). Northwesterly winds associated with a prolonged negative state of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) drove unusual volumes of polar surface water and ice through Fram Strait into the Greenland and Iceland Seas (Dickson et al., 1988; Hurrell, 1995; Belkin et al., 1998) . The cold, stratified water reduced phytoplankton production, and hence the zooplankton on which herring needed to feed (Astthorsson et al., 1983; Gislason, 1995, 1998) . The north Iceland feeding grounds became a virtual desert (Vilhjálmsson, 1997) .
The herring thus lost a main feeding area while under intense fishing pressure -annual removals exceeding one million tonnes. This combination of overfishing and environmental change led to a total collapse lasting more than two decades. On land, the herring towns faced crisis.
SIGLUFJÖRðUR, NORTH ICELAND'S 'HERRING CAPITAL'
In 1890, Siglufjörður was a small-scale farming and fishing settlement, home to fewer than 100 people. Its mountainous surroundings, near-Arctic climate and remote location, at the northern end of the Tröllaskagi peninsula (66.1°N, 18.9°W), made it a poor site for commerce or farming. People fished for cod from small boats and kept a few sheep, or if fortunate, a cow. They gathered hay for the livestock, and sometimes cultivated small potato or vegetable gardens. Ships could land in the fjord, where a small store provided them with goods, and by doing so opened economic possibilities, such as selling salted cod, for local people who were not landed farmers.
Siglufjörður's location turned out to be perfect for herring, however. During the 20th century, when Norwegian spring-spawning herring were found to be abundant on feeding grounds north of Iceland (Figure 4.1a) , Siglufjörður boomed as the 'herring capital of the world'. It grew to become the fifth largest town in Iceland, and an engine pulling the national economy. Then, as the herring declined and ocean/climate change forced herring feeding grounds off to the east (Figure 4 .1b-c), Siglufjörður declined too. Eventually, Siglufjörður faded back into minor status, struggling with the common fishing-town dilemma: what to do next, when the best fish are gone?
The story of the herring capital's rise and fall has been described in socialhistorical terms by Sigurðsson (1989 Sigurðsson ( , 1990 , and more recently in an interdisciplinary paper by Hamilton et al. (2004a) . The Herring Era Museum in Siglufjörður, which earned the European Museum Forum's Micheletti Award in 2004, tells the town's story through a rich collection of exhibits, photographs, reconstructions and documents (see Kristfinsson, 2001) .
Herring north of Iceland became known to Norwegian fishers in the late 19th century, and in 1903, Norwegians arrived in Siglufjörður to pursue the resource. They established Iceland's first processing factory, reducing herring to fishmeal and oil; the first salting line, to produce high-value fish for human consumption; and the first storage facility, for products awaiting export. Icelanders were hired to work in the new industry, drawn from Siglufjörður and elsewhere. Other herring towns (síldarstaðirnir) in North and East Iceland took part in this boom, but as more factories and salting lines were built, and a growing fleet of foreign and Icelandic vessels brought in the catch, Siglufjörður remained dominant. Through the early 1950s, Siglufjörður was salting more herring each year than the rest of Iceland combined (Sigurðsson, 1990) . In several years the herring exports from Siglufjörður constituted more than 20 per cent of all exports from Iceland (Kristfinnsson, 2001) . The initially labour-intensive fishery made substantial cash wages available to many people for the first time. Farmers denounced the herring towns as they watched their labourers depart for new opportunities. Young Icelandic women, the herring girls (síldarstúlkur), ignored warnings of sin and moved to Siglufjörður, taking arduous but well-paid jobs processing and salting the catch. The town's year-round population increased tenfold (from 144 to 1450) over the period 1903-1924, then doubled again by the late 1930s. The seasonal workforce, arriving with the herring from May through October, added several thousand more. Thousands of foreign fishers, when they came ashore, swelled the population even further. This largely young, unattached workforce found in Siglufjörður a previously unimaginable degree of economic and social freedom. There were opportunities for dancing, music, and entertainment -the town hosted 18 public bars in the 1920s (compared with only two today). There still exists a whole music genre, on recordings and in the older people's memories, of 'herring-waltzes' (síldarvalsar) from the herring years, many describing the atmosphere in Siglufjörður back then. The jobs themselves were demanding, driven by the pace of the fishery. When herring were landed, whatever the quantity, they had to be processed at once. Although work was hard, it was also rewarding to a degree that few participants, and virtually no women, had previously known. Labour in the herring fishery provided many young people from poor backgrounds with savings they would subsequently invest elsewhere in housing, education and new businesses, climbing in one generation into the middle class. The freshest herring were salted and sold at good prices for human consumption. The refuse and remainder went to the factories for reduction into fishmeal and oil. At its peak, Siglufjörður boasted 27 salting stations and five fishmeal factories in operation, far more than other towns such as Raufarhöfn (ten stations, one factory), Akureyri (six stations) or Húsavík (five stations, one factory) in North Iceland, or their East Iceland counterparts such as Seyðisfjörður (nine stations, two factories) and Neskaupstaður (six stations, one factory) (Kristfinnsson, 2001) .
Siglufjörður flourished while herring were plentiful in local waters. Good years became infrequent after 1953. At the same time, factories became more automated, requiring fewer workers. Boats travelled increasingly farther north and east to find the remaining fish, eventually towards Jan Mayen and Svalbard, out of range for small boats, and too far away to bring back herring fresh enough for salting. The golden years in Siglufjörður had been fading for more than a decade, before climatic changes in the 1960s finished the resource off. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the town's population fell steeply (Figure 4 .4). 
Figure 4.4 Populations of three herring towns: Siglufjörður in North Iceland, and Neskaupstaður and Seyðisfjörður in East Iceland
Resource declines caused by overfishing, environmental variation or both are a nearly universal experience among fisheries-dependent communities. When resources decline, some people migrate away, while the community left behind seeks a 'Plan B'. Alternative fisheries, or diversification to other species, often ones that were previously less valued or less abundant, tend to be the first idea. Alternative fisheries hold obvious attractions for fisherfolk, although they might employ fewer workers than the old fishery, and the 'new' species could be subject to depletion as well. Another idea tends to be tourism. The remote locations, rugged geography and narrow resource base of fisheries-dependent communities that could discourage other kinds of development might be turned into attractions to tourists.
Siglufjörður after the herring era has shown all these patterns. The herring resource, for which the town was built, had been eroded by overfishing, then collapsed with environmental change. Outmigration shrank the town's population. Alternative, more diversified fisheries have become mainstays of the smaller economy today -capelin (Mallotus villosus), a different small-pelagic species, are reduced for fishmeal and oil, while cod (Gadus morhua) and shrimp (Pandalus borealis) are landed for human consumption. The harbour is quiet and empty, compared with its heyday in the mid-20th century.
To move beyond fishing, Siglufjörður residents are lobbying for a new tunnel to the south, towards Eyjafjörður and Akureyri. One argument for the tunnel is tourism. Siglufjörður's vivid history as the herring capital, with its first-class museum and fine scenery, provide credible tourist attractions, but at present the long drive from the main road or cities remains problematic. A southern tunnel, however, would bring Siglufjörður within easy bus-tour range of Akureyri, the urban centre of North Iceland, with its airport, cruise ships and summer tourists.
For the cycle from small village to prosperous fishing centre, decline, and the search for an alternative, Siglufjörður provides the archetype. Other towns have followed similar cycles, although not often so starkly.
HERRING TOWNS OF EAST ICELAND
Icelandic herring catches, displayed in Figure 4 .3, show two distinct high eras. The first was during the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s. This comparatively low-technology labour-intensive era brought thousands of jobs to Siglufjörður and other herring towns. Then, as herring biomass shrank, and the remaining fish were found farther north and east, the fishery entered a new era. Low-tech inshore vessels could no longer reach the fish.
The great terminal 1960s spike of Iceland's second herring era reflected catches by a more industrialized, long-distance fleet based in East Iceland towns such as Seyðisfjörður (65.3°N, 14.0°W) and Neskaupstaður (65.2°N, 13.7°W). New post-war technologies, the power block, nylon nets and sonar, allowed massive catches and masked the resource decline. Larger ships ranged far to the east and north to find the fish (compare the chronology in Figure 4 .3 with the corresponding maps in Figure 4.1) .
Contemporary narratives about the last decades of Iceland's herring adventure describe the dramatic shift of fishing activity from North Iceland to the Eastfjords. Social activity, and the eyes of the nation, followed this shift as the herring retreated farther and farther east. When the fishery ended, almost in an instant (1968), the herring's earlier retreat looked in retrospect like a warning of what was just around the corner.
The excellent harbour of Seyðisfjörður had become one of Iceland's first herring ports when Norwegians started fishing there in the late 19th century. By 1901 the population passed 1000, compared with fewer than 150 in Siglufjörður (Figure 4.4) . However, the herring catches there declined, and Seyðisfjörður grew no further, whereas Siglufjörður began to boom after 1910. In the mid-1930s two herring plants were built in Seyðisfjörður, and new vessels were purchased. The herring plants often had an insufficient supply of fish, so to raise catches, a trawler was allotted to the town by the government in 1946 (one of several distributed to Icelandic municipalities as a way to provide jobs). Herring salting resumed in 1950, after a lapse of 50 years. One plant was enlarged in 1956, then rebuilt in 1962, as Seyðisfjörður became more important (and Siglufjörður less so) in the east-shifting herring fishery. Seyðisfjörður processed massive volumes of herring during the fishery's terminal spike in the period 1962-1967 (see Figure 4. 3), before the resource disappeared.
During the peak year of 1966, Seyðisfjörður processed some 150 000 tonnes of herring and salted 108 000 barrels. Hundreds of students and fishers came to work in this short-lived boom; similar opportunities no longer existed in Siglufjörður. Norwegian ships also came to fish, but they processed their herring onboard. Although the eastern boom involved far more fish per year than the northern boom ever had, it created fewer jobs owing to its more modern, industrialized methods.
Following the collapse, Seyðisfjörður's herring plants turned to alternative species. One became a cod freezing plant in 1969; another had little to do for five years until a fishery emerged for capelin. Unlike Siglufjörður, Seyðisfjörður also possessed significant demersal fish resources. In 1972, another trawler was purchased to fish for cod. Cod landings overall increased as herring catches dipped (Figure 4. 3), and together with capelin this allowed Seyðisfjörður's population to continue growing after the herring crash, until cod too declined and outmigration became marked (see Figure 4 .4).
There was a similar pattern in the nearby herring town of Neskaupstaður. Even during the herring era, many small boats in Neskaupstaður fished for cod and other demersal species, providing jobs in the absence of herring. Working in cod processing was socially stigmatized compared with working in herring, the bigger, more exciting fishery. The herring fishery demanded harder physical work, intense for short periods, but requiring limited skills. It appealed to younger workers, more so than the comparatively stable and technical cod fishery. Having the alternative of cod, however, left Neskaupstaður a way out of the herring crisis. In 1970 Neskaupstaður was among the first towns in Iceland to buy a stern trawler to fish cod, allowing it to bridge the gap between the herring era and what came afterwards -the trawler era.
In Seyðisfjörður and Neskaupstaður, both the rise and the fall of the herring era came later and much faster than in Siglufjörður. Because East Iceland fisheries were more diverse and less labour-intensive, immediate socioeconomic impacts of the herring collapse were less harsh. However, when cod catches fell too, a few decades later, the Eastfjords towns were left in similar dire straits.
The herring collapse was a national shock, with impacts not confined to the herring towns. Unemployment increased around Iceland; net outmigration jumped during the years 1969 and 1970 to its highest levels since 1887 (Statistics Iceland, 1997). Herring and cod had been the economy's main pillars; the loss of one highlighted the nation's vulnerability to environmental forces, and the need for diversification beyond fish.
RÅKVÅG, NORWAY
Norwegian landings of spring-spawning herring have a much longer history than Iceland's, but follow a broadly similar 20th century path (Figure 4 .5). Many Norwegian towns also suffered as the herring declined, then collapsed. One example is the small rural community of Råkvåg (63.8°N, 10.1°E) on the Fosen peninsula in Sør-Trøndelag county, midNorway (Figure 4.1) .
The first known period of economic growth based on the herring fishery in the Fosen area was from about 1590 to 1670. There are few data available concerning environmental conditions so long ago. Norwegian books about coastal history (Trondheim Bys historie, 1956; Sjurseth, 1961; Bjøørkvik, 1972; Bergen Bys historie, 1979; Tufteland et al., 1986) , or about the history of herring fisheries in Norway (Fasting, 1960; Vollan, 1971 ) note the boom of the herring fisheries then, and their subsequent collapse. There was evidently a shift in herring migration around 1600, because formerly successful herring fisheries in the area between Denmark and Sweden collapsed at the same time that herring fisheries in Norway bloomed. Danish and Swedish fishers applied to the King in Copenhagen to take part in the Norwegian herring fisheries. The Fosen peninsula with its two western fjords, Stjørna (where Råkvåg is situated, at the mouth of one river) and Bjugn, was the most successful area for herring fishing in the whole of Norway. The population in those two municipalities increased by 250 per cent in the period from 1610 to 1665.
The two fjords are part of a huge geological structure that starts in the west at the Norwegian continental shelf, rises above water around the fjord area and the river basins, and continues far inland as a wall of old granite. This westbound geological structure (forkastning) tends to capture efficiently what comes with the warm North Atlantic Current as it sweeps along the west coast of Norway. Some consequences are unpopular, such as the clouds that tend to collect at the inner end of the fjords. Other consequences are more favourable: the strong circulation of warm seawater into the narrow fjords so that, when herring are abundant, the fish tend to be trapped there as well. One reason for the success of these two municipalities in the old herring fishery relates to characteristics of the shoreseine, which was the most efficient fishing gear at that time. One end of the seine had to be anchored to land, usually at a pier. As soon as the seine was circled around the herring, the other end was dragged to land again either by men or horses. The landscape of Stjørna and Bjugn is ideal for a shoreseine, and every year when the herring arrived, farmers and tenants alike stopped other tasks to concentrate on fishing.
From about 1670 to 1890, more 'normal' conditions prevailed for Norway's herring fisheries, punctuated by occasional local or regional booms and collapses. Some places, especially on the west coast, specialized in herring and were the first to explore new technology. Others, like Råkvåg, were content with the old fishing routines and waited for the herring to come to the places that suited their traditional gear.
The second period of expansion in population and activities in the Råkvåg area came in the period 1890-1945, roughly the same growth period (and for much the same reason) as Siglufjörður, though not reaching the same size. Never before or since did Råkvåg become so important relative to the rest of the Fosen and Trøndelag area. This applied to both business and community life. From being an impoverished community with some tenant, fisher and farmer families, Råkvåg became the most affluent community on the Fosen peninsula. The population increased, both farmers and tenant families had a noticeable rise in living standards, and the community was enriched with more resident citizens and businessmen. It was a gradual development, with a wide spectrum of adjustments from the most dependent tenants to farmers gaining access to the ranks of the capitalists. In addition, businessmen came from other towns and established canning factories with their own export markets and boats. This created considerable competition for the local herring resources, and some conflicts arose between the new groups and the community's old élite. The long-standing landowners were still a dominant factor. They owned most of the land, and through these property rights they had full control of the local trading rights and most of the shared rights in the major shore-seine cooperative enterprises.
The best period for Råkvåg was between 1910 and 1920. Then, the concentration of herring came exactly to mid-Norway between Stadt in the south and Halten in the north, as it had done when the two fjords marked their position for the first time as rich herring sites. The herring were captured by the shore-seine cooperatives, usually 10-20 men. At its peak, the village of Råkvåg had 12 such cooperatives. Businessmen from all along the coast came with their vessels and bought the herring, to be salted onboard and transported in barrels to the markets. Because of its good harbour and rich community life, Råkvåg became the centre of this activity for the whole area. Some buyers established fish salting businesses at Råkvåg, increasing both activity and competition. The favourable market conditions during World War I motivated even more people to take part, until herring were being caught long before they could reach the inner end of the fjords. Shore-seine cooperatives therefore lost out in competition against the more mobile purse-seines, though the purse-seiners then were mainly steampowered vessels without hydraulic equipment, expensive and not very efficient. As markets became more problematic in the 1920s, many of these capitalist companies went bankrupt, while the shore-seine cooperatives still managed to survive. Independent of the increased competition at sea, which was moving to the disadvantage of Råkvåg, local fish-salting companies and a herring oil factory provided both women and men with work. In this way, the local fishing community managed to survive without dramatic change until the end of World War II.
The halt in most fishing during World War II allowed fish populations a chance to recover from fisheries depletion. The immediate post-war situation was probably as close to what might be considered 'a natural state of fisheries' as we saw during the whole 20th century. In this situation, the two fjords in Bjugn and Stjørna proved their reputation as the best herring fjords in mid-Norway. Råkvåg entered a new, more extensive, hectic and shorter period of growth. Herring were the basis for growth, and conditions in the fishery also caused the collapse. These conditions were not simply a matter of resources, however. Råkvåg was outmanoeuvred by more effective vessels and operating routines, as the fishery became more industrial, parallel to the second phase of Iceland's herring era.
Already in the early 1950s Råkvåg had concentrated on fat herring, a seasonal fishery some time after Christmas, that provided the local salting businesses with their raw material. In the ordinary herring fishery (of spring-spawning herring) there was no more room for the shore-seine as the catches were taken far out at sea either by purse-seiners or by vessels with drift nets. Both these types of vessels used new hydraulic equipment, but purse-seiners became dominant when the herring almost disappeared after 1956. Purse-seiners' new technology (especially the power block and nylon nets) allowed them to operate in deeper water and farther from shore, where the remaining fish were found. Again, Norwegian developments ran parallel to those in Iceland, half an ocean away.
Purse-seiners also tended to explore other resources as one stock declined. Consequently, they turned to fat herring in the late 1950s when spring-spawning herring became scarce. This shift by the seiners suddenly eliminated the one niche left for the fleet and fish processors of Råkvåg. Figure 4 .6 reflects the declines of both population and fishers in Råkvåg, alongside the herring collapse. As in Siglufjörður, Råkvåg's decline coincided with the expansion of the more capital-intensive offshore fishery, well before the terminal spike and collapse.
Despite the herring difficulties, the standard of living in Råkvåg was better than ever, and class differences were resolutely broken down. For the first time, however, the community suffered a merciless rationalization evaluation by the State. The question arose: what was the point of people living in places like Råkvåg? Norway found itself among the poorest countries in Europe in the late 1950s, which left little concern for maintaining a pattern of settlement based on vanishing resources. The situation was paradoxical. On one hand, fisher families were becoming relatively independent of the 'big men' and acquiring a material standard of which they had only dreamt. They had also put their own people into the system. On the other hand, they found that Råkvåg was being pushed out of active community life, and that they had to move to participate in the modern welfare state. 
Figure 4.6 Population and number of registered fishermen in Råkvåg, shown with the total Norway herring catch through the crisis years
Up to the 1970s, it was possible to survive in Råkvåg by taking other occasional work in the service industries or commuting to industrial centres. In the latter part of the 1970s, politics became more favourable to the community, with the implementation of the so-called counter-cyclical policy. The economic prerequisite for this new policy was Norway's improved economy, based on oil drilling. The political prerequisite was the strong mobilization in rural communities in connection with the EEC referendum in 1972.
It is interesting to reflect that the National Insurance Scheme, which was introduced in 1967, would probably have moderated the economic collapse in Råkvåg if it had come in 1960. Because it came seven years after the worst crisis, it only rescued those who could no longer compete in the labour market (the old and the sick). Moreover, herring regulations in the 1970s virtually froze the situation as it was in fisheries at that time. Boat owners gained concession rights, and these rights were then considered more or less as an added value to the sale price of the vessels. It was also the case that the State in a way bought the right to reduce the catch capacity of the deep-sea fleet by compensating the owners with several million kroner when they transferred their vessels to another country. This guarantee was not available when the Råkvåg shipowners were being outmanoeuvred.
The situation in Råkvåg today depends on the State standing guarantee for continued settlement. In the last instance, both the municipality's activities and the main sources of residents' income (commuting and welfare) are dependent on State support. This leaves little basis for independent political initiatives. For the Fosen peninsula as a whole, much of the productive, marketable activity has disappeared. Rates of registered unemployment are low, but these do not measure what is actually produced.
In recent years, Råkvåg has seemed more conscious of this position of political dependence. Some of the younger leaders, who built their houses in the most promising period of the 1970s, view it as problematic that the authorities (municipality or State) can make political decisions that are disadvantageous to the local population. In connection with unpopular decisions, such as the destruction of a local salmon river to build a power station, or placing a waste deposit in the area, locals have come to realize that they have no political say. Business development such as tourism could strengthen their hand. Tourism has increased every year since local organizations and businesses began their summer arrangements in the mid1980s. One can say that Råkvåg has awakened after years of slumber, but no longer as a fishing community. Rather, it appears as a museum for a vanished fishing community.
In Norway, there were many similar places with such Klondike experiences in herring. Many sank into a long-term crisis connected to the decline of the fishery in the 1950s and its total collapse in the late 1960s. A few communities, however, succeeded in maintaining their fishery through the years of virtually no herring. They managed by converting their activities to an alternative pelagic species, capelin, as in Iceland. Through this adaptation they stayed in business during the decades it took for herring stocks to rebuild. As a result, these few towns today are the herring élite, the only ones able to benefit from the reborn fishery. Råkvåg, on the other hand, experienced the collapse without state intervention, and hence lost its place in the fishery. In the decade from 1980 to 1990, the few remaining fishers in Råkvåg earned only about US$100 000 from fishing.
TELECONNECTIONS TO THE PACIFIC?
Correlations between small-pelagic fisheries catches have been noted across long distances, and even across oceans. The fisheries of Iceland and Norway are correlated because both involved the same migratory stock, Norwegian spring-spawning herring. Other correlations have less obvious causes, however. Figure 4 .7 shows 20th century catches of herring from waters off Iceland and British Columbia. Although oceans apart, the two series' correlation is 0.7, meaning that about half of their variance (r 2 ϭ .49) is shared. Both series show nearly simultaneous take-offs in the late 1930s, and peaks followed by collapse in the 1960s. It might seem reasonable to guess that they are linked climatically, with changes communicated in some way through the atmosphere. This guess makes sense if we interpret fish catches as proxies for abundance, but Figure 4 .2 demonstrated why such an interpretation is risky. Trends in Norwegian spring-spawning herring biomass and catches actually went in opposite directions during the 1950s and early 1960s. It was not abundance, but human factors, postwar technologies and markets, that drove catches to an unsustainable peak, quickly followed by collapse. Similar technologies and markets influenced the British Columbia herring fishery, and could have produced its similar, nearly simultaneous, collapse.
The scatterplot in Figure 4 .7 reveals that the two fisheries' correlation derives mainly from the common boom from 1930 to 1970, and particularly from the high-catch outliers of the early 1960s. These high points represent artifacts of international markets and technology rather than signs of unprecedented abundance. Power-block assisted purse-seines of strong nylon mesh, guided by sonar to find schooling fish, were innovations after World War II that allowed rising catches at a time of falling stocks. In this example, it appears that human activities, instead of or in addition to climatic forces, caused the herring catches to follow parallel trends across different oceans.
In general, the hypothesis of 'human teleconnections' across spatially or ecologically distinct fisheries deserves serious consideration as we look for signals from climate. Technologies and markets have global reach, and act rapidly. Moreover, the ecological consequences of fishing down dominant species could well extend this reach to a wide range of non-targeted marine species, as well as to social systems on land.
DISCUSSION
Dependence on a vast shared resource built up the economies of herring towns around the north-central and northeastern Atlantic during the first half of the 20th century. During the postwar years, culminating in the early-1960s spike, the fishery rapidly drew down its resource. This killer spike disastrously coincided with an adverse climatic event, collapsing the fishery in the late 1960s. That pattern, of collapse resulting from climatic variation on top of overfishing, has characterized other fisheries crises (for example see Hamilton et al., 2004b) . The fisheries events reflect a more general proposition: climate changes tend to impact human affairs largely through interactions with resource use and distribution behaviour, which can reduce or exacerbate climate impacts. We should not expect to see simple, physical impacts from climate alone, unmitigated by social factors.
The importance of social factors becomes particularly clear if we compare neighbouring places (such as herring towns) that took divergent paths during a common ecological change. When inshore herring became less plentiful off mid-Norway or North Iceland, that ecological shift privileged port locations with better offshore access, and also those enterprises or individuals who invested in more technology-and capitalintensive fishing styles, which permitted them to range farther and deeper, pursuing whatever fish remained. This suggests a second general proposition: technological and capital intensification are common responses to resource depletion. In the short term, intensification succeeds, even while accelerating the depletion. Traditional, labour-intensive production styles cannot so easily extend their range, and hence suffer more immediately as resources thin.
A depleted species might rebound, or new species might take its ecological place. In the decades since the late-1960s herring collapse, industrial fisheries focused on capelin, while herring eventually began to recover. Resource recovery or substitutions did not return the old state of social affairs, however -a third general proposition from this study. The shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive fisheries, more concentrated and in different locations, was not reversed. Places or enterprises that enjoyed ecological advantages, or made advantageous choices during transition times, later maintained their advantage through market or regulatory arrangements such as quota rights despite further ecological change (see Hamilton et al., 2003 , for a similar 'tale of two cities' from West Greenland). Social institutions can affect the longer term outcomes of change either by redistributing resources to the losers, or by reinforcing the new position of winners.
When their staple resource vanished, herring towns had to find other livelihoods, with varying degrees of success. Some combination of alternative fisheries, aquaculture and tourism constitute the standard alternative plan. Fishing towns often have historical and picturesque qualities that could well make them tourist drawcards, but development is limited by the supply of tourists, who are no more infinite than fish and can be scarce in remote coastal regions. Råkvåg's proximity to the urban area of Trondheim enabled it to become a regional attraction. Siglufjörður hopes for better connections to the relatively small urban centre of Akureyri, which in turn has natural and cultural attractions, transportation links and an established tourism industry that could send international visitors north to the old herring capital. Eastfjords towns such as Seyðisfjörður and Neskaupstaður are farther from tourist circuits and other attractions. At the time of writing, a cruise ship from Denmark and Norway regularly calls in Seyðisfjörður, providing income and jobs. Prospects for expanding East Iceland tourism substantially are uncertain, however. One possibility, the development of the dramatic highlands wilderness as an ecotourism destination, might have been set back by competing decisions regarding the lands.
Large-scale energy or mineral developments comprise yet another plan for some parts of the north, and they can evolve into a new main plan. The Kárahnjúkar hydroelectric megaproject in East Iceland, scheduled for completion by 2007, gives a striking example. This US$3 billion project, financed by Iceland's National Power Company, centres around a 190 m high rockfill dam under construction in the highlands northeast of Vatnajökull glacier. The dam will create a 57 km 2 reservoir above the canyon of the Jökulsá á Dal river, and divert the river's water through a 39 km tunnel to join the Jökulsá í Fljótsdal river to the east. A powerhouse by the Jökulsá í Fljótsdal will then generate the electricity.
Prime customer for the electricity will be a new aluminium smelter, under construction in the depressed former herring town of Reyðarfjörður (just south of Seyðisfjörður and Neskaupstaður, and in the same municipality as the latter). This smelter, itself costing more than US$1 billion, is financed by the US company Alcoa. It represents the largest private investment in Iceland's history. The Icelandic government's political support and deep financial stake in Kárahnjúkar (as well as connected investments by national and local governments in infrastructure) have been justified by the estimated 1000 permanent jobs it might create, many at the smelter in Reyðarfjörður. The smelter and related development, it is argued, could stem the outmigration of young people that has been eroding the Eastfjords population since their fisheries declined. Through an indirect social path, fisheries troubles thus feed back to drive wholesale transformation of inland ecosystems and landscapes, as well as a former fishing fjord.
